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Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc., wrote an assessment for the Washington Post this past weekend of al Qaeda on its twentieth anniversary.
Strategy and MeansBergen, long considered one of the world’s foremost authorities on the infamous terrorist organization, argued that al Qaeda “…is more famous and feared than ever” but that’s its primary goal, the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East, “…has been, by any measure, a resounding failure.” Bin Laden’s basic strategy, Bergen says, has been to topple the secular governments of the Middle East and to establish in their place Islamic governments in the Taliban tradition. Bin Laden believed that attacking the United States and forcing a massive U.S. response in the Middle East would cause an Islamic uprising that would force the Americans out while simultaneously ousting despised secular regimes. Where it Went WrongAccording to Bergen, bin Laden’s strategy might have succeeded if the United States did not have vital national interests in the Middle East such as dependence on foreign oil, an Israeli ally, and the stability of a region seemingly always in turmoil. What happened following the 9/11 attacks was a massive increase in U.S. involvement in the Middle East, just as bin Laden desired. But there was no Muslim uprising and no secular governments in the region were toppled by angry Islamists. In fact, as Bergen notes, the U.S. has worked since 9/11 to strengthen its ties with most governments in the Middle East. So What’s Next?Given the failure of his strategy, one might think that bin Laden would re-evaluate his position and his plan of attack. Not so, according to Bergen, who maintains that bin Laden is still focused on the United States. But bin Laden and his ilk have largely been marginalized as a direct threat to the U.S. The real danger now lies in his ability to serve as an inspiration, or role model, for the thousands of local and regional terrorist cells that have sprung up since al Qaeda proper went on the run after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in late 2001. So when Bergen says that the U.S. has far less to fear from al Qaeda than it did in 2001, he is partially correct. The original core of al Qaeda has seen its capability diminished greatly over the past seven years. But the thousands of hardcore terrorists who have answered bin Laden’s call since 9/11 represent a new threat, inspired by the world’s most famous terrorist, that could inflict carnage on America for many years to come.
The copyright of the article Reassessing Al Qaeda in Middle Eastern Affairs is owned by Greg Reeson. Permission to republish Reassessing Al Qaeda in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
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